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Liquidity and Efficiency in Three Related Foreign 
Exchange Options Markets  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The foreign currency market in a small open economy, like Israel, plays a major role in 
fiscal and monetary policy decisions, through its effects on the financial markets and the 
real economy.  In this paper we explore the liquidity and efficiency in three related 
foreign exchange options markets and the information content of the instruments traded 
in these markets.  The unique data set on OTC trading and the central bank auctions, in 
addition to the exchange traded options provide us with insights about the operation of 
these markets, their relative efficiency, their information content and their 
interrelationship. An important aspect is the effect of liquidity on the pricing of options in 
these markets. As expected, we find that, except for extreme cases, liquidity does not 
affect options prices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
      
      In small open economies international trade plays a major role in the economic life of 
the country. It is an important part of GDP and contributes to the welfare of the economy. 
International transactions, involving goods and services or financial ones require 
exchange of currencies.  
The rate at which one currency is exchanged for another depends not only on economic 
variables prevailing in both countries but also on the exchange rate policies in those 
countries including non transparent interventions by the authorities in both countries. 
Typically, a large country will not intervene in the currency exchange with a small one 
(e.g. Israel, Poland, Hong Kong). Thus, in a small open economy the exchange rate will 
depend on the exchange rate policy in that country in addition to the economic variables 
that determine the demand and supply of the currency.  
In recent years, especially after the ’97 Asian currency crisis, many small countries have 
abandoned the old restrictive policies in favor of less interventionist policies. Many have 
moved to a fully floating exchange rate though some of them have an unofficial 
intervention policy for cases when the currency moves outside a given range. 
Since 1997 the Bank of Israel has not intervened directly in the currency market. Though 
it only recently (2005) abolished the official exchange rate band the currency movements 
were not restricted since the band was so wide1 that effectively it was ignored. Moreover, 
the currency markets have been totally liberalized2. Thus the exchange rates in recent 
years have been set in a free market environment. The volume of trading in spot dollar 
has increased substantially during the last decade and so did the trading in dollar 
derivatives; forwards and options.  
Another recent development in many countries has been the use, by central banks3 of 
forward looking information derived from prices of traded instruments like CPI linked 
bonds, to obtain inflation expectations, or FX option prices, to obtain the distribution of 
FX rates. The Bank of Israel which has been using inflation expectations, derived from 
                                                 
1 The width of the band during this period was almost 65%. 
2  Since July 1997 the Bank of Israel adopted a policy of non intervention in the FX market. This policy has 
not been changed even in turmoil periods such as the LTCM crisis in October 1998.  
3 The Bank of England is known to be using such information, in forming its monetary policy, for a number 
of years now. 
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linked and non-linked bonds, for many years has recently added to its menu information 
derived from prices of FX options.   
FX options in Israel are traded in three markets; the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (hereafter 
TASE), the banks’ Over-The-Counter (hereafter OTC) market and the Bank Of Israel 
(hereafter BOI) auctions. Though the three markets trade essentially the same instruments 
the markets have different structures and different regulations which may result in 
differences in the information provided, in liquidity, in efficiency, etc. This raises the 
question, which is the relevant one? Should we pay attention to the more liquid market or 
to the more transparent market? Should we combine the information provided by all three 
markets? And, how spreads and implied volatilities are determined?  
The objective of this study is three fold: First, to explore the efficiency of these related 
markets. Since the three markets trade the same instruments we can study the effect of 
different market structures on their efficiency and liquidity. Secondly, to examine the 
information content, its time series behavior, and its relevance. Third, what role does 
liquidity play in the price formation in these markets? 
The next section of the paper provides a review of the relevant literature. Section III 
describes the FX market in Israel and the data. Section IV provides the methodology and 
the hypotheses. In section V we analyze the results, section VI provides an analysis of 
liquidity in these markets, section VII compares the forecasting ability of the future 
realized volatility of the three markets, and section VIII provides a summary and 
conclusions. 
 
 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Though foreign exchange markets, spot and forward, are the largest global 
markets in the world, the research effort to study these markets has been relatively 
modest compared to the research on equities markets or the fixed income markets. It is 
especially so for research on FX options markets. Moreover, research which focuses on 
the role that options markets play in policy decisions made by central banks is even 
scantier.  
Next we will briefly describe the main findings regarding FX options in general and then 
discuss the papers which deal with the use of FX options by central banks. 
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It is first important to mention some general studies, not option based, which have looked 
at realized volatility in order to learn about the dynamics of the underlying asset, namely 
FX rates. One such study, by Andersen et al. (2001), using high frequency data on DM/$ 
and Yen/$ find high correlation across volatilities, persistent dynamics in volatilities and 
correlation and long memory dynamics in volatilities and correlation. 
Using options on currency futures trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Jorion 
(1995) finds that implied volatility, though biased, is a better predictor of future volatility 
than other time-series models. This finding is corroborated by a later study of Szakmary 
et al. (2003) on 35 futures markets which include 5 currency futures. For the FX options 
in their study, they find that IV is a better predictor of Realized volatility than Historical 
volatility. These papers use daily data and use Black’s model (1976) to compute implied 
volatility. In a more recent paper Pong et al. (2004) use high frequency data and four 
methods for forecasting currency volatility. They find that intraday exchange rates 
provide more accurate forecasts for short horizon volatilities, up to a week, while for 
longer horizons, one and three months, implied volatilities are at least as accurate as the 
intraday data. A study by Campa and Chang (1995) explores the term structure of 
currencies’ volatility and finds that short term volatilities are more variable than long 
term ones which highlights the issue of stochastic volatility in currencies. A couple of 
recent studies have examined the stochastic nature of volatility. Low and Zhang (2005) 
use currency options traded in the OTC market to study whether volatility risk is being 
priced in the options. Using at-the-money straddles they find that volatility risk premium 
is negative and it decreases with maturity. The above studies have essentially used near 
the money options or averages of implied volatilities across strikes. Bollen, Gray and 
Whaley (2000) use currency options to determine whether market prices reflect a regime 
switching behavior of the currency market as their model suggests. They find that option 
prices do not fully reflect the regime switching information. Duan and Wei (1999) use a 
GARCH option pricing methodology to value FX options. Their results show that their 
model can explain the stylized facts observed in the FX market like, for example, “fat 
tails”. The dynamics of implied volatility in the FX market are also studied by Kim 
(2003) who finds that current large fluctuations in the currency market have a significant 
effect on expected future volatility as exhibited by implied volatility. It is also claimed 
that traders' private information affects implied volatility in the short run. A study by Carr 
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and Wu (2004) examines the implied return distribution of FX rates. They use OTC 
option quotes on two active currencies; the yen/$ and the BP/$. They analyze the 
behavior of option implied volatility across moneyness, maturity, and calendar time. 
They find that it is symmetrically higher in the tails (a “smile”) and persistent over long 
maturities and calendar time. The symmetry, the “smile”, phenomenon in currency 
options could be simply explained by the fact that either tail represents the strength of 
one currency and the weakness of the other one. A “leverage” type argument where a 
decline in the basic asset triggers an increase in volatility would apply equally to both, the 
out-of-the-money puts and the out-of- the-money calls.  
Liquidity is found to substantially affect prices in many asset classes and markets (see 
Amihud and Mendelson, 2006). The effect of liquidity on the pricing of FX options is 
examined by Brenner, Eldor and Hauser (2001). Though, as pointed out in their paper, 
illiquidity should not affect the prices of derivatives, they find that the illiquid BOI 
options have traded at a 20% discount. This is explained by the fact that the writer, the 
central bank, does not demand a liquidity premium while the buyers do. In a similar study 
on the non-tradability of Treasury derivatives in the Israeli market Eldor, Hauser, Kahn 
and Kamara (2006) find that the non-tradables had a premium of 38 basis points. Another 
recent paper by Eldor, Hauser, Pilo and Shurki (2006) finds that the introduction of 
market makers in ILS/EUR options, traded at TASE, increased volumes and decreased 
the bid ask spreads. This paper is relevant as ILS/USD options which are included in our 
study and traded at TASE without a designated market maker while those ILS/USD 
options traded in the OTC market are dominated by large commercial banks which 
provide two sided quotes and effectively act as market makers.  
In general, most studies use currencies of large and developed economies; the U.S., 
Japan, Britain, Europe. Also, some of these studies use exchange traded prices (e.g. The 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange or The Chicago Mercantile Exchange) while others use 
OTC transactions data. The tradeoff here is between the small volume of transparent 
exchange transactions and not as transparent OTC trading which is where almost all FX 
trading is done. Thus, the lessons from these studies may not be applicable to the many 
smaller but open economies. In fact, in such countries the information obtained from such 
markets could play even a bigger role in policy decisions by the government and/or the 
central bank. Since most of these currency markets were, until recently, controlled or 
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managed by the government or the central bank the information content was rather 
limited. Also, most of the trading was done in the OTC banking system and data was not 
easily available, in particular data on options trading4. 
In our study, however, we had access, not only to the exchange traded data but also to the 
OTC-banks’ data. We use data from three different markets where only one of them, the 
TASE, is completely transparent. The data of the other two, however, is reliable since it 
is reported by the central bank, the BOI auction data, and the OTC data is reported by 
each bank to the central bank as required by law. This is the most comprehensive data on 
ILS/USD transactions available as it is gathered from all markets that trade these options 
in Israel.5   
 
 
III. THE FX MARKET AND THE DATA 
 
The FX market in Israel  
The currency market in Israel was essentially a free market during the sample 
period but most transactions in the spot market are done through the banking system. The 
US dollar is the most traded currency (second comes the Euro) by corporations, financial 
institutions and individuals. Trading in spot and forwards is done OTC, through and by, 
the banks. Trading in futures and options is done on the TASE and in the OTC market. 
Some options are issued by the central bank (BOI) in an auction, twice a week. 
Trading in currency options on the TASE has commenced in 1994 and its volume has 
increased steadily until 2001 where our sample period begins. The options trade in a 
continuous electronic market. 
    [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
During the first half of 2002, after the unexpected cut of interest rate and the 'Palestinian 
Intifada', the volumes increased dramatically but later they returned to the pre 2002 
levels. Since the inception of trading on the exchange the banks have been offering their 
                                                 
4 The trading in derivatives by the banks is tailor made and may include exotic features. In the case of 
options the bank will typically be the writer. 
5  To the best of our knowledge these FX options did not trade in any other market outside of Israel during 
the sample period.  
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customers a variety of FX options, plain vanilla and exotic ones. The third source of FX 
options is the BOI. Since 1993, the BOI has been offering At-The-Money-Forward 
(ATMF; X=Se(r-r*)t, see Table 2  for  definitions of the terms), put and call options for 
three and six months, respectively. These are offered in an auction twice a week and do 
not trade until expiration. 
 
 
              Description of the data 
In this study we use data from these three distinct but related markets. Our sample 
consists of call and put options on the US dollar (USD), paid in the New Israeli Shekel 
(ILS) for the period October 2001 to December 2004. Data is collected, on a weekly 
basis, from the local banks for OTC options, from the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange for 
TASE options, and from the Bank of Israel for BOI options. The collected data covers all 
transactions of ILS/USD options in Israel6 and, to the best of our knowledge it is the most 
comprehensive data set available7. No other study has used all three sources of data, in 
particular the OTC data, and had the same objectives as ours. The study by Brenner, 
Eldor, and Hauser (BEH) (2001) focused on the effect of liquidity on the auctioned BOI 
options by comparing them to the options that trade on the TASE. Also, our study uses 
current data, a period free of constraints on currency trading. The data consists of prices, 
volumes and open interest. All options, including the banks’ OTC options, are plain 
vanilla European type options. They differ by their strike prices and maturities. They all 
are cash settled using the so called “representative” exchange rate published by the Bank 
of Israel during afternoon hours each trading day8. We use the LIBOR (London Interbank 
Borrowing Offered Rate) and the short term Makam (the domestic equivalent of LIBOR, 
issued by the BOI) rates as the foreign and domestic interest rates, respectively.  
                                                 
6 Since July 1997 the BOI is not intervening in the currency market and in 2004 the final step in the 
liberalization of the currency market has been implemented.  
7 Since the banks are obliged to report all their transactions to the BOI we assume that our data is the most 
comprehensive available. 
8 The representative rate is calculated by sampling the exchange rate prevailed among local banks between 
14:15 and 15:15 on Monday thru Thursday and between 12:15 and 13:15 on Friday. Using closing prices or 
the mean of the daily exchange rates has not affected the results in any meaningful way.  See Appendix 1 
for details.  
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     We start with the computation of implied volatility9 (IV) to filter outliers that may 
either bias the results and/or may introduce noise that has very little to do with the normal 
conduct of the market. First, we exclude from the sample observations with missing 
values such as days to expiration or striking price. Secondly, we exclude from the sample 
outliers by defining the following a-parametric filter regarding implied volatility: [Q1-
3·(Q3-Q1)] ÷[Q3+3·(Q3-Q1)]where Qj is the jth quartile {j=1..4}10. As a result of the 
exclusion, the number of transactions in our sample was reduced by 4 percent and 
amounted to 34,529 in OTC, 21,182 traded in TASE, and 315 in BOI daily auctions11.  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
Table 1 provides a glimpse of the differences in several aspects between these markets. 
The upper panel provides a qualitative comparison of basic features of these markets. For 
example, it depicts the type of players in each market and the spectrum of derivative 
instruments. The lower panel of Table 1 provides some numbers regarding volume, open 
interest and size of an average trade. The BOI market is relatively small compared to the 
other two markets.  The main idea behind the central bank involvement, writing FX 
options, was to provide a vehicle to hedge FX risk when such a market did not exist and 
provide a benchmark that will help create such a market. The notional volume offered in 
the auctions was always limited. On the other hand, the size of the other two markets is in 
principle unlimited and indeed over the years they grew rapidly. The average volume of 
TASE is much higher than that of the OTC (8.1 billion USD per month versus 4.6 billion) 
while, open interests, notional values per transaction and accordingly actual premiums of 
OTC options are higher than those of TASE12. These differences reflect the various 
characteristics of TASE and OTC markets. In Particular, time to expiration is longer on 
                                                 
9  As all options are European plain vanilla, IV derived from option prices traded on the three markets is 
calculated in the same way. However, there is one substantial difference due to data limitations; the daily 
IV of OTC market is derived from all transactions during the trading day while those of TASE and BOI are 
based on closing prices.   
10  As a result the biggest IV is approximately 25% and the smallest is 1%. A different filter which includes 
only transactions whose implied volatility is within the range of µ±2σ has not changed the results, 
significantly.  
11  Each BOI auction is for a mean notional of approximately 20 million US dollars (puts and calls for 3 and 
6 months maturities).  
12 By the Bank of International Settlement (2003), the annual turnover of currency options that are traded 
on organized exchanges was about USD1.3 trillion in 1995 and declined to USD0.36 trillion in 2001. In 
contrast, the annual turnover on the OTC markets was about USD10.25 trillion in 1995 and about USD15 
trillion in 2001.   
 - 10 -   
the OTC and moneyness13 is more negative (i.e., more Out-of-The-Money-Forward – 
OTMF) in that market (see Table 2). These differences are reflected in the various 
implied volatilities (IV): the highest IV is on the TASE which is characterized by many 
small transactions while the lowest IV is derived from the BOI options where actually 
only banks are participating in this market and it is characterized by a few large 
transactions (an auction twice a week). Later we discuss this phenomenon in more detail. 
In Table 2 we present basic statistics of these markets regarding volumes, implied 
volatilities, moneyness, and time to expiration. The BOI options are only calls and puts 
with a 3 month maturity however, we did not restrict, in Table 2, the moneyness of the 
other two markets to just ATMF options, as are the BOI options. 
The results of the comparison of the 3 markets exhibit the importance of the so-called 
'implied volatility surface' (combinations of time to expiration and moneyness with 
regard to IV)14. The highest average implied volatility, 9.1%, is obtained from options 
traded on the TASE, the OTC options imply a volatility of 7.9% while the BOI options 
have an implied of 6.7%. These differences can be explained by various transactions 
costs due to differences in; transactions size, time to expiration and moneyness. 
Illiquidity, in general, could not explain differences in IVs in efficient derivatives 
markets, as explained in Brenner et al. (2001) except for a case where one side is the 
writer like the central bank. Even then the difference should be up to transactions costs. 
This may explain the lower IV for the BOI options but we have no reason to believe, a 
priori, that illiquidity can explain the difference between the prices on the TASE and 
those set in the OTC market unless the markets are inefficient or there is a dominant 
player e.g., the banks in the OTC market. An important factor explaining the lower IV for 
ATMF BOI options vis-à-vis the OTC and TASE is the “smile” effect which will make 
the weighted average IV for the OTC and the TASE higher. The two markets here, the 
TASE and, to some extent, the OTC exhibit a “smile” which is also been found in most 
currency markets (see for example, Carr and Wu (2004)). Time to expiration is expected 
                                                 
13  Defined in this paper as 
*r t
C rt
SeM Ln
Xe
−
−
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
for call options and *
rt
P r t
XeM Ln
Se
−
−
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 for put options 
where, S is the spot rate, X is the striking price, r and r* are local and foreign interest rate, respectively, and 
t is time to expiration in annual terms.  
14  Goncalves and Guidolin (2005) also find that the surface derived from the S&P500 is important in 
constructing profitable strategies. Thus, arbitrage opportunities can emerge in the surface edges rather in 
the center, options that are away from the money rather than at-the-money. 
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to partially offset the former effect. These overall observations will be later contrasted 
with observations derived from options with comparable strikes and maturities. 
As robustness tests we have used some alternative exchange rates (see Appendix 1) and 
call options vs. put options (Table 3). It appears that the results are not sensitive to either 
the somewhat different underlying exchange rates that we use or to the type of option, 
call vs. put. 
 
    [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
In both markets, however, we find that the mean of implied volatilities derived from call 
options is higher than that of put options which is a violation of put-call parity (the 
options are European).   
Another interesting observation is that the ratio of call to put transactions in TASE is 
larger than the respective figure regarding the OTC. The difference in the call/put ratio 
could be explained by the dominance of retail customers on the TASE who are using 
options either to speculate or hedge their risk against depreciation in the ILS/USD 
exchange rate. Also, the moneyness of the calls is less Out-of-The-Money-Forward 
(OTMF) than puts while days to maturity of calls are longer. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES, AND TESTS 
The spot FX market 
In Table 4 we present some basic statistics of the changes (Log(St/St-1)) in the 
ILS/USD exchange rate. Although the Jarque-Bera test strictly rejects the hypothesis of a 
normal distribution, the rejection is due to deviations around the mean rather than “fat 
tails” and it seems to be symmetric. We next examine the volatility of the exchange rate 
over the period of the study, 10/2001-12/2004, using three alternative models of the 
GARCH family.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
As observed for other exchange rates, we first used a GARCH (1,1) which treats the 
errors symmetrically. Yesterday’s variance has the strongest effect on the subsequent day 
which is evidence of persistence. This evidence is consistent with the high 
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autocorrelation exhibited by the time series of IVs.  The error term (shock or news at day 
t-1) does not have a significant effect on the current variance compared to the variance of 
yesterday which is an indication that the typical error term is small and its effect fades 
away quickly. The second and the third models are the Threshold GARCH (see Glosten 
et al., 1993) and Exponential GARCH which split the errors in two, positive and 
negative, to examine the possibility of asymmetric effects on the variance. It turns out 
that the inclusion of a positive/negative dummy is justified as the coefficient turns out to 
be significant. Thus, a positive shock to the ILS/USD exchange rate occurred in day t-1 
influences the latter volatility of day t more than a negative shock. It should be noted that 
a negative economic shock in a small open economy would usually show up in a large 
devaluation of the currency with respect to the major currencies and that will be 
associated with a rise in the volatility of the exchange rate. Interestingly, as we show  
later this apparent asymmetric behavior will not show up in the behavior of the IVs.  
 
 
The Similarity of the Three FX Option Markets 
In the first set of tests we try to answer the following question: is the information 
content as measured by implied volatility and more directly by the option premium the 
same in all three markets? If it is different, what are the factors that explain the 
difference? Alternatively, is there room for arbitrage between the markets?  
Thus, our null hypothesis is that the three markets are integrated and any 
difference should be explainable by transactions costs. The null hypothesis regarding any 
pair of markets e.g., BOI vs. TASE, BOI vs. OTC, and TASE vs. OTC, is tested by two 
methods:  
1. Comparing implied volatilities (IV) computed from similar options. 
2. Comparing option prices using the methodology outlined in Brenner, et al. (2001).   
The IV is computed using the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model adjusted for FX 
options (Garman-Kohlhagen, (1983)). All options in our study are European type and are 
cash settled. Though, in general, empirical observations are not consistent with model 
predictions due possibly to stochastic volatility or/and jumps, the model performs 
relatively well when applied to FX options (see for example, Jorion, 1995). In fact, the 
common practice in the global FX market is to quote and trade in IVs, especially ATMF 
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options. Moreover, we have no reason to believe that the presence of stochastic volatility, 
for example, should induce a bias in comparing the three option markets which relate to 
the same underlying asset.  
Our first test uses the IVs of basically ATMF options. Since our task here is to compare 
options markets on the same underlying we can use the same price transformation as long 
as the options do not have very different specifications. 
 
 
V. HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 
We first present the hypotheses and results by comparing the distributions of IV 
across the 3 markets. The null hypothesis H0: IV(BOI) = IV(TASE);  IV(BOI) = 
IV(OTC); IV(TASE) = IV(OTC), is tested using several parametric and non-parametric 
tests. In Table 5 we summarize the results in words since the alternative tests give us 
similar answers as to their significance. In other words, the results are robust vis-à-vis the 
tests we employ.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
We first test the differences in mean, median and variance between the BOI and OTC and 
between the BOI and TASE. Since the BOI options are always ATMF and issued with 3 
month to maturity we try to match, as closely as possible, the OTC and TASE options to 
the BOI terms. As reported in Table 5, top panel on the left, we could not reject, at the 
5% level, the null hypothesis that the implied volatility of the OTC or TASE is the same 
as the one derived from the BOI options. This contradicts the IV results that were 
reported by Brenner et al. (2001) for BOI options vs. TASE options in an earlier period. 
However, it is consistent with the results in their last period when the markets matured 
and became more efficient.   
In testing the OTC vs. the TASE we used all options across strikes (ITMF, ATMF, and 
OTMF) and maturities and the results were, by and large, different. The hypothesis of 
equal mean, median, and variance was rejected for OTMF and ITMF options while for 
ATMF options, only the equal mean hypothesis was rejected. A similar picture is 
revealed by looking at Figures 2 and 3.  
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[Insert Figures 2 and 3] 
 
Figure 2 depicts the IVs derived from all data (excluding the outliers, as described in the 
data section) while Figure 3 uses comparable data only. Using all the data the IVs derived 
from TASE options are the highest, as observed in Figure 2 and Table 2, while those of 
BOI are the lowest.  These differences largely disappear when comparable data is used, 
as can be observed in Figure 3. The average IV in the three markets; BOI, OTC, TASE, 
are indistinguishable from each other (7.2%, 7.5%, and 7.5%, respectively).   
These results lead us to look for the source of the differences between the results that use 
all available data and the results that use only common data. Is the difference all in the 
tails? Does it all result from OTMF/ITMF options? Are the differences in the tails a result 
of “fat tails’ in the underlying asset or due to transactions costs and/or relative liquidity? 
Though we could not reject the hypothesis of the same information content using the 
mean of IVs as our statistic we were mainly interested in finding out whether the 
differences in liquidity in these markets is the source of the difference in IVs (prices). 
The BOI is at one extreme where, after the auction, the options do not trade until 
maturity. The TASE options are on the other end, where the same options trade or, could 
trade, all the time until maturity. The OTC options are in between where similar, not the 
same, options could be issued any day but usually the position is not offset by trading. 
Though these differences in liquidity do exist, it might not show up in price differences, 
or IV differences, in efficient markets for two reasons: As explained above, and in 
Brenner et al. (2001), derivative assets should not command a liquidity premium or a 
discount since they are a zero-sum game. Moreover, in any efficient derivative markets 
potential arbitrage, in particular across option markets on the same underlying asset, 
should eliminate price differences between the markets up to transactions costs. In 
contrast, price differences can prevail if there are liquidity problems i.e., if there is not 
enough supply/demand to carry out the arbitrage.  
 
In the upper panel of Table 5 we present the results of a test that uses the difference in the 
prices of options to test for differences between these markets (based on the 
methodology in Brenner et al. (2001)). The price difference, also termed the liquidity 
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premium, of OTC versus TASE depends on moneyness .While the average price of 
TASE options using all options is larger than OTC ones by 3.1%, the average price of 
OTMF TASE options is larger than that of OTC by 8.3 %. In contrast, the mean price of 
ATMF TASE options is smaller than that of OTC by 4.6% and for ITMF options there is 
almost no difference. These results are also shown in Figure 4. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
On the upper left side of the figure i.e., the 1st quintile of the distribution of both 
moneyness and 'time to expiration', TASE options are more expensive than OTC options. 
In the 3rd quintile this is reversed, the TASE options are less expensive. Thus the 
differences in IV (or, in prices) do not coincide with differences in liquidity which 
supports our argument that in derivative markets illiquidity should not be a pricing factor 
as it is in the underlying asset markets once the markets are efficient. We thus should be 
looking for another explanation for the differences we observe in the moneymess domain. 
One possible explanation could be that the banks are mainly the writers of OTMF options 
and the customers will be locked in their position unless they create an identical 
offsetting position on the TASE or on the OTC which they will carry to maturity which 
amounts to a non-tradeability discount that is very costly to arbitrage. The opposite may 
be true for ATMF options where the banks could be mainly on the buying side15. To 
verify this conjecture we would need detailed data on option customers' positions which 
are currently unavailable. Another angle would be to examine the measurable 
transactions costs that an arbitrageur would incur assuming that the banks are not the 
dominant players on either side, long or short. Could transactions costs associated with 
arbitraging the OTMF OTC options with the ATMF wipe out the differences in prices 
since it will require dynamic hedging? 
Concerning the three markets, the pair wise comparison of comparable daily data, bottom 
panel of Table 5, shows that, on average the BOI options have a discount of about 2.9% 
vis-à-vis OTC and 2.5% vis-à-vis TASE. Although it is statistically significant, to 
arbitrage these differences will cost more than 3% whether the other market is the OTC 
or the TASE. It should be noted that we used the same methodology used in Brenner et 
                                                 
15  A similar argument is made in a recent paper by Deuskar et al. (2006).  
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al. (2001) and the results for BOI vs. TASE are drastically different, where the discount 
in the last period of the study, 1996-97, amounted to 15% before transactions costs. 
Apparently, it has taken the markets 4 years to reduce this discount to the current 
transaction costs levels.  
The other interesting comparison is between the OTC options market and the TASE. 
Though the options issued by the banks in the OTC market are essentially bi-lateral, 
tailor made agreements, and as such do not trade until maturity, we found that the same 
options, using the above matching methodology, by strike price and maturity, have 
essentially the same prices; the mean difference is 1.4% which is lower than transactions 
costs in these markets. Hence, arbitrage activity between these markets is probably not 
profitable except for deep Out-of-The-Money-Forward (OTMF) short term options. This 
exception, which was also found by Low and Zhang (2005) may reflect a volatility risk 
premium and/or the dominance of Banks on one side of the trade, long or short. 
 
 
 
OTC versus TASE: A closer look  
Though the options issued by the BOI are used as a benchmark, the lessons from 
this market are limited since they are limited in size, frequency, strike prices and 
maturities. The two sizable markets which trade similar instruments but have very 
different market structures are TASE and OTC. We hope that what we learn here will 
help us understand other similar markets. In essence we have an electronic options 
market in FX which trades continuously and concurrently with the spot market and an 
OTC market which offers the same kind of options, long or short, but these options do 
not trade in a secondary market. Potentially one can reverse his position by entering a 
new contract with the same terms or offsetting his position with the bank’s consent. 
Given our unique data set that includes essentially all contracts made in the OTC during 
10/2001 and 12/2004 we can learn about how the two markets compete and/or 
complement each other. We are especially interested in the micro structure differences in 
the two markets and how they affect trading in these markets. Figures 5a and 5b present 
the surface (IV along moneyness and 'time to expiration' quintiles) of OTC and TASE, 
respectively. 
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[Insert Figures 5a and 5b here] 
 
As one can see the main differences between the two surfaces are in the edges. 
Particularly, short term OTMF TASE options (quintile 1 in both dimensions) are more 
expensive compared to the respective OTC options while the opposite holds for ITMF 
options. The TASE options surface exhibits more of a 'smile type' surface while the OTC 
surface seems more flat with a slight ‘skew’.  
 
 
VI. LIQUIDITY AND TRANSACTIONS COSTS  
            Though these markets are strongly related they differ by their structure, liquidity 
being an important feature, and by their players. In this section we would like to focus on 
micro-structure issues and how they may be affecting the integration and efficiency of 
these markets. Since the BOI options are sold twice a week in an auction in limited 
quantities and have minimal transactions costs associated with them16, we will focus our 
attention on the two main markets, the OTC and TASE. 
In Table 6 we provide information on the bid-ask (B-A) spread, usually the main 
component of transactions costs, in these two markets.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
First, the mean proportionate B-A spread (the B-A spread divided by the average B-A) 
across all option series on the TASE is about 17.5% while on the OTC market it is about 
9.5%. This difference can be explained by the differences in trading in the two markets.  
The main difference between the two markets is in the way that these markets trade. In 
the OTC, one can get a firm quote from a bank any time during the trading day, while on 
the TASE the B-A spread is provided by the buy and sell limit orders that continuously 
arrive at the market. Since there is no market maker who is willing to quote both sides all 
the time we may have wider spreads in the less liquid options, the OTMF which are far 
                                                 
16  As discussed before, the BOI options are issued by the central bank and do not trade until maturity. The 
effect of this non tradability (illiquidity) has been investigated in Brenner et al. (2001) on an earlier period.  
Here we reexamine it in relation to the TASE and to the OTC. 
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out.  This argument is consistent with Eldor et al. (2006) who find smaller B-A spreads in 
the ILS/EUR options traded on the TASE after market makers had started to operate. 
Also, it should be noted that the quoted/displayed B-A spreads only measure the cost of a 
given trading volume and does not tell us about the cost generated by a bigger order, the 
so called ‘price impact’. 
When we examine the more liquid options series here, the OTMF we find that in both 
markets the spreads are lower than in the ATMF and ITMF options. Moreover, the 
differences between the two markets are much smaller, 2.7% for OTMF options (13.9% 
on the TASE vs. 11.2% on the OTC) and 4.9% for ATMF options (18.1% vs. 13.2%).  
The variance of the B-A spread across all options is also smaller in the OTC market 
which again may be explained by the ‘market making’ position that the banks effectively 
assume.  
An important factor affecting the B-A spread of a basic asset is the volatility of the asset. 
Here, however, we are dealing with the B-A spread in the options market and its 
relationship to the volatility of the underlying asset. These we believe can be related 
arguably by a hedging argument where the volatility of the underlying affects the B-A 
spread of the underlying which affects the B-A spread of the option since the option can 
be replicated by the underlying and vice versa. On the other hand, if we use IV to 
represent expected volatility, under B-S-M, a higher IV should result in a higher B-A 
spread and vice versa. A higher B-A spread which reflects also less liquidity, of the 
combined markets, may result in higher volatility. Thus, our hypothesis is that both IV 
and B-A spreads are determined simultaneously and have a positive impact on each other. 
This hypothesis is in contrast with the current practice to regressing B-A spreads on 
volatility. We are testing the B-A spreads relationship to IV in TASE and OTC using 
Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) Regressions.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
To minimize the effects of serial correlation that characterizes both series and avoiding 
different levels of integrations, we have applied the 3SLS to the first differences of daily 
IV and B-A spreads17. The upper panels of Table 7 (panels (a) and (b)) depict the results 
                                                 
17  The differences are all I(0). 
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of OLS regressions where IV and B-A spreads are regressed on moneyness, days to 
expiration, and size. In both markets B-A spreads and IV positively influence one each 
other as expected. Size measured in the regressions as the options' notional values is 
positively (although not significant) affecting the IVs while its impact on B-A spreads is 
not unequivocal. Size should negatively influence B-A spreads while the positive 
relationship with IV can be explained by the turbulent periods, reflected in high levels of 
IV, which are characterized by more transactions and volumes in the option markets. 
Days to expiration may have a negative effect on IV due to mean reversion and/or 
volatility risk premium as in Campa and Chang (1995) and Low and Zhang (2005). The 
impact of moneyness on IVs is positive and robust for TASE while negative and less 
significant for OTC. This is associated with the shapes of the respective surfaces (figures 
5a and 5b): the “smile” phenomenon is observed only in the TASE while the shape of the 
OTC surface is more flat and slightly 'skewed’. Finally, in both markets the endogenous 
variables are highly autoregressive – a phenomenon also found in other studies (see 
Granger and Poon, 2003).    
In the lower panel of Table 7, IV and B-A spreads are regressed simultaneously on the 
above exogenous variables using 3SLS. In almost all cases the results are the same either 
in the direction of the impact or the level of robustness. Our main conjecture concerning 
the interrelations between IV and B-A spreads in the FX market, to the best of our 
knowledge, has not been reported before. 
We also examined the differences between the OTC and TASE markets regarding their 
market depth and efficiency. Following Eldor et al. (2006) who examined the efficiency 
and depth of the ILS/EUR options market traded on the TASE, we use the so called 
“Amihud measure” (see Amihud, 2002), the change in price associated with volume 
changes as a measure of depth, the IV surface (by measuring its skewness) and the 
deviations from put-call-parity. In all of the above measures, figures closer to zero reflect 
more efficient and deeper markets. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
It can be seen that in most cases the figures for the TASE are smaller. I.e., it is more 
liquid and more efficient than the OTC market. This is reasonable as the TASE market is 
 - 20 -   
more transparent and accessible to the public. Market depth of the TASE, calculated as 
the ratio of the percentage change of option prices relative to the volume, in each trading 
day,  is larger than in the OTC in all moneyness categories. For example, the OTC figure 
is 6 basis points (hereafter bp) compared to 2.9 bp in TASE's ILS/USD options and 2.8 
bp in TASE's ILS/EUR options (see Eldor et al. (2006)).  
The second comparison looks at the IV surface by estimating its skewness. These 
deviations from Black and Scholes (1973) assumptions (the 'smile' or 'smirk' effect) may 
be related to a decreased liquidity and/or higher transaction costs. The skewness of both 
markets was negative while that of OTC was almost 6 times larger (in absolute values) 
than that of TASE. The respective figure regarding TASE's ILS/EUR options reported in 
Eldor et al. (2006) is between the OTC and TASE ILS/USD options.  
The third comparison looks at the deviations from put-call-parity, which could provide 
arbitrage opportunities, in both markets. The deviations are smaller in the TASE across 
all moneyness categories compared to the OTC. For example, the deviations across all 
transactions was -3.4 bp in OTC compared to -0.5 bp in TASE and approximately -16 bp 
in TASE's ILS/EUR options as reported in Eldor et al. (2006)18.  
To summarize these findings, although the B-A spread, a measure of liquidity, is 
smaller on the OTC than on the TASE, the latter seems to provide greater depth than the 
OTC, especially in the options which are ATMF or slightly OTMF. This difference 
probably reflects the differences in the micro structure of these markets. Thus, while the 
prices, as reflected in their IVs, are the same as a result of arbitragers operating in both 
markets, the B-A spreads of TASE are larger than those of the OTC due to the fact that 
the TASE is a pure electronic market with no designated market makers while in the 
OTC the banks effectively act as 'market makers'. However, when it comes to options 
that trade frequently in bigger quantities the electronic market making becomes less 
important. The effective market making activity can also explain the differences in the 
                                                 
18
 The substantial differences between this study and that of Eldor et al. (2006) can be explained by the 
differences in averaging. Eldor et al. (2006) calculate the deviations from put-call-parity, transaction by 
transaction and then average all deviations. Instead, we calculate the deviation of every single trading day 
using single spot rate, single local, and single foreign interest rate, then we average over all trading days. 
Thus, our results are less robust although the differences between the OTC and TASE are consistent with 
the other measures and with our conjectures. 
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volatility surfaces in these markets. The apparent relative deviations from put-call parity 
in the OTC market may not reflect arbitrage opportunities since it is not transparent and 
continuous as is the TASE. 
 
 
VII. FORECASTING ABILITY OF ILS/USD FUTURE VOLATILITY  
Information content of options can be examined in several ways. One such 
examination is to look at the forecasting ability of option prices vis-à-vis the future 
volatility of FX spot. Figure 6 presents the IV derived from BOI options, future realized 
volatility, and a VIX (using the volatility index methodology) measure applied to the 
ILS/USD exchange rate. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
In order to avoid overlapping in the forecasts, we derive the various IVs for the next 
quarter using 3 months options traded at the first week of each quarter. The Figure shows 
that the various IVs are higher almost in all the sample period than the future realized 
volatility within the next quarter. However, the correlations among all IVs and between 
them and the future realized volatility are relatively high (see the lower panel of Figure 
6). Since we have three options markets operating concurrently we would like to know 
whether they have the same ability to forecast the future realized volatility. We compute 
implied volatility from all options as well as ATMF options only, in all three markets. 
The realized future volatility (RV) for the next quarter is computed using daily returns of 
ILS/USD in each quarter except the first week. The IV of all three markets is highly 
correlated with RV, about 0.8 while the correlation coefficient among the IV of the three 
markets is higher – around 0.97. We test the forecasting ability of the three markets by 
using two tests: Mean Errors (ME) and Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE). The former 
reflects the direction of the error biasness while the latter reflects the accuracy of 
forecasting. In general, all forecasts overestimated the true volatility as in Christiensen 
and Prabhala (1998) and Szakmary et al. (2003). However, forecasts derived from ATMF 
options outperformed forecasts based on all options. In addition, among the three 
markets, BOI and OTC ATMF were the best forecasters although all three markets were 
 - 22 -   
close in their forecasting ability. These results support further the evidence that the three 
markets function rather efficiently, are closely related and arbitrage activity may not be a 
profitable activity.  
The interrelations between the three markets are prominently shown around the days of 
expiration at the TASE.  
 
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
 
The table presents volumes and number of transactions of the three markets across the 
days of the month. While the differences between these days are random the days around 
the expiration at TASE are characterized by very high volumes and number of 
transactions in all markets. For example, the volume in an average day in OTC and BOI 
are 41% and 27%, respectively that of the expiration day. In contrast, a day before 
TASE's expiration the figures go up to 61% and 94%, respectively and a day after 
expiration these figures jump to 92% and 86%, respectively. These phenomena reflect 
both the 'roll over' of the expiring options to the new ones and the interrelationships 
among the three markets where large volume in TASE is related to large volumes in the 
other markets.  
        
 
 
 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores the efficiency of three related FX (ILS/USD) options markets, 
the effect of liquidity and the information content of the instruments traded in them in the 
period 10/2001–12/2004. The unique data sets on the three markets: Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange (TASE), Over The Counter (OTC) and Bank Of Israel (BOI), provide us with 
insights about the operation of these markets, their relative efficiency, their relative 
liquidity, their information content and their interrelationship. Specifically, we compare 
the implied volatility (IV) surface, liquidity measures such as the bid-ask (B-A) spread, 
market depth and the forecasting ability of these markets controlling for moneyness, time 
to expiration, and other explanatory variables. We find that the differences between the 
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markets as reflected in their IV or B-A surfaces is not large (across moneyness and time 
to expiration). Moreover, although the IV surface in TASE is a 'smile type' and that of 
OTC is flat with a slight 'skew’ there is no arbitrage opportunity.  What seems to be an 
arbitrage opportunity, in the very short term far OTMF options, is probably wiped out by 
transactions costs. For these options the B-A spread is the widest and the volumes are the 
smallest. It is also found that IV and B-A spreads are simultaneously determined, have a 
positive affect on each other and mainly influenced by the shape of the IV function rather 
then time to expiration, size, or other explanatory variables examined. These findings 
apply more to the TASE and less to the OTC market – perhaps due to the above 
differences in shapes. In general, B-A spreads in TASE are wider than in OTC possibly 
due to the dominant position of local banks who act as market makers in the OTC FX 
option market. In contrast, market depth and efficiency measures that were larger in 
TASE than in OTC offset the B-A spreads of the former. This unique data set provides us 
with an insight on the relative importance of the various factors affecting options prices, 
in particular the non role of liquidity, in contrast to the underlying assets market. 
Comparing the forecasting ability of future volatility by the current IV during the sample 
period shows that forecasts derived from ATMF options; particularly BOI and OTC 
options outperform all other alternatives. However, all forecasts have over-estimated the 
realized future volatility during the sample period. These findings are relevant for policy 
making as well for investors in small open economies. Further research is needed to 
examine the factors that affect both the IVs and the B-A spreads where the same 
instrument trades in several markets simultaneously.    
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Figure 1
Daily volume mean of ILS/USD options traded in TASE
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
IV 2005
II 2005
IV 2004
II 2004
IV 2003
II 2003
IV 2002
II 2002
IV 2001
II 2001
IV 2000
II 2000
IV 1999
II 1999
IV 1998
II 1998
IV 1997
II 1997
IV 1996
II 1996
IV 1995
II 1995
IV 1994
II 1994
V
o
l
u
m
e
s
 
(
U
S
D
 
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
)
Figure 2
ILS/USD exchange rate and IV of BOI, OTC, and TASE, FX options
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1) Daily means of all options and no filttering. Days when all 3 markets were active.
Figure 3
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Figure 6
Correlation Coefficients Matrix
TASE - ATMF BOI OTC - ATMF Future volatility
Future realized volatility 1 0.78 0.79 0.80 1
OTC ATMF 2 options 0.98 0.99 1 0.80
BOI 2 options 0.98 1 0.99 0.79
TASE ATMF2 options 1 0.98 0.98 0.78
TASE - ATMF TASE - ALL BOI OTC - ATMF OTC - ALL
ME3 -1.09% -1.34% -0.68% -0.82% -1.17%
RMSE4 2.7% 3.3% 1.9% 2.0% 2.8%
Correlation coefficient 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.79
1)  Calculated as the standard deviation of daily changes (%) in ILS/USD exchange rate over the next quarter.
2) Derived from implied volatility of 3 months ATMF options traded in the first week of each quarter. 
3) Reflects the direction of the biasness of the forecast from the future realized volatility [Avg (realized-IV)].
4) Measures the disperssion of the forcast around the future realized volatility [Avg (realized-IV)2].
(comparabale quarterly data, 2002Q1 - 2005Q2)
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Table 1
Qualitative comparison
TASE OTC BOI
a. Market efficiency
    Liquidity (Secondary market) Yes No No
    Transaction costs (Commission & bid-ask spread) High Medium Low
    Transperacy to the public High No Medium
    Open interest Medium High Low
     Instruments Options only Spot/FRA/Swap/Option Options only
b. Avalabililty
     Currency USD/EURO All Currencies USD
     Time to expiration 1/2/3/6/12 months All months 3/6 months
     Moneyness +/- 5% from ATMF(1) Any Moneyness ATMF only
     Instruments Options only Spot/FRA/Swap/Option Options only
     Strategies trading Medium High No
c. Transaction and main players characteristics
    Transaction size Small Large Medium
     Sophistication 
and players
Low (household/ mutual 
funds)
Medium (All sectors 
except mutual funds) High (Banks only)
Quantitative comparison(2)
TASE OTC BOI
Volume (USD Billion)
FRA & Swap - 7.7 -
Options3 8.1 4.6 0.10
Open Interest (USD Billion)
Options3 3 11.4 0.4
Notional value per transaction (USD) 187,526 4,211,730 2,639,752
Actual premium per transaction (USD) 1,978 39,200 41,920
No. of transactions (per option) 60 1 2
Time to expiration (days) 36 74 90
Moneyness 0.12% -0.98% 0.00%
Implied volatility 9.1% 8.2% 6.7%
(1) Without filterring. The data for the OTC includes interbank transactions
(2) All options are European plain vanila based on monthly averages                                  over the sample period.
(3) At the contracting time.
General comparison of the 3 FX derivative markets
Table 2
Over The Counter (OTC)
34,529 Transactions
Mean Std Min Max
Notional value per transaction (USD)2 3,550,183               4,944,590               5,257                      100,000,000           
Actual premium per transaction (USD) 32,686                    77,040                    0.201                      2,597,400               
Days to maturity 74                           90                           1                             1,209                      
Moneyness3 -0.9% 2.2% -19.4% 16.0%
Implied volatility 7.9% 2.6% 1.2% 24.8%
Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE)
21,182 Transactions 
Mean Std Min Max
Notional value per transaction (each 
contract is written on USD10,000)2 270,978                  575,368                  10,000                    17,800,000             
Actual premium per transaction (USD) 4,547                      19,829                    0.218                      1,387,904               
Days to maturity 42                           39                           2                             371                         
Moneyness3 -0.3% 3.0% -16.7% 16.1%
Implied volatility 9.1% 3.6% 1.3% 32.5%
Bank of Israel (BOI)3
315 Observationss
Mean Std Min Max
Notional value per transaction (each 
contract is written on USD1,000)2 3,045,121               1,642,756               999,800                  10,000,000             
Actual premium per transaction  (USD) 43,440                    24,521                    8,016                      110,000                  
Days to maturity 90                           1                             89                           93                           
Moneyness (0%)4 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Implied volatility 6.7% 2.0% 3.7% 11.6%
Moneyness Quintiles 1                             2                             3                             4                             5                             
OTC -19.4% -2.2% -1.1% -0.3% 0.5%
TASE -16.7% -2.7% -1.1% 0.2% 1.9%
Days to Expiration Quintiles 1                             2                             3                             4                             5                             
OTC 1                             20                           31                           56                           100                         
TASE 2                             16                           28                           38                           57                           
 (1)   
 
 The data in this table is not filtered neither in moneyness nor in days to expiration.
(2)  In OTC market each transaction is equal to one contract, in TASE each transaction contain on average 60 contracts while in BOI auctions each daily transaction 
         reflects the amount sold to the investors (there were 315 days during the sample period). 
 (3)  Moneyness is defined for Call options as:     and for Put options as:    
   Where, S is the spot rate, X is the excersize price,  r* and r are the LIBOR and Makam          rates, respectively, and dt is time to expiration in annual terms.
(4) all options are issued At The Money (ATMF) i.e., Moneyness = 0.     
The 3 FX option markets: Basic statistics 
(Call and Put options, no filterring  1)
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Table 3
Mean Std Min Max
Calls (18 ,418 transactions)
Notional value per transaction (USD)2 3,580,313                 5,044,077                 5,257                        100,000,000             
Actual premium per transaction (USD) 32,633                      68,112                      0.20                          2,002,000                 
Days to maturity 76                              99                              1                                1,209                        
Moneyness3 -0.6% 2.1% -16.9% 16.0%
Implied volatility 8.2% 2.7% 1.2% 19.7%
Puts (16,111 transactions)
Notional value per transaction (USD)2 3,515,739                 4,828,273                 10,000                      75,350,000               
Actual premium per transaction (USD) 32,747                      86,121                      0.20                          2,597,400                 
Days to maturity 71                              78                              1                                734                           
Moneyness3 -1.3% 2.2% -19.4% 8.5%
Implied volatility 7.5% 2.5% 1.3% 24.8%
Mean Std Min Max
Calls (12,435 transactions)
Notional value per transaction (USD)2 264,036                    574,390                    10,000                      17,800,000               
Actual premium per transaction (USD) 5,128                        20,286                      0.22                          1,387,904                 
Days to maturity 46                              43                              2                                371                           
Moneyness3 -0.2% 3.2% -16.7% 15.9%
Implied volatility 9.4% 3.7% 1.3% 32.5%
Puts (8,747 transactions)
Notional value per transaction (USD)2 280,846                    576,643                    10,000                      15,020,000               
Actual premium per transaction (USD) 3,720                        19,133                      0.22                          829,717                    
Days to maturity 36                              33                              2                                370                           
Moneyness3 -0.5% 2.6% -11.2% 16.1%
Implied volatility 8.7% 3.5% 1.8% 30.7%
(1) The data in this table is not filtered neither in moneyness nor in days to expiration.
(2) In OTC market each transaction is equal to one contract, in TASE each transaction contain on average 60 contracts while in BOI auctions each daily transaction 
   reflects the amount sold to the investors (there were 315 days during the sample period). 
(3)  Moneyness  is  defined  for  Call  options  as: and for Put options as:    
          Where, S is the spot rate, X is the excersize price,  r* and r are the LIBOR and Makam rates, respectively, and dt is time to expiration in annual terms.
Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE)
A comparison between OTC and TASE: Basic statistics by the type of option
(Call vs. Put options, no filterring1)
Over The Counter (OTC)
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Table 4
Dependent Variable (Yt): ILS/USD changes (%)
GARCH(1,1) Basic statistics
 Mean -0.0014%
 Median 0.00%
 Maximum 2.39%
 Minimum -2.15%
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   Std. Deviation 0.4305%
 Skewness 0.10               
λ 0.00 0.00 -0.59 0.56  Kurtosis 2.96               
 Jarque-Bera test
ω 0.00 0.00 2.53 0.01 for normality 15.25
α 0.05 0.01 4.68 0.00  Probability 0.00
β 0.95 0.01 95.65 0.00
Threshold GARCH - TARCH(1,1)1 Augumented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test3
(Maximum Lag length = 10)
None -7.2
Constan t only -7.3
Constant and Trend -13.5
Phillips Perron (PP) test3
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  (Barttlet Kernel)
None -13.59
λ 0.00 0.00 -0.38 0.70 Constant only -13.55
Constant and Trend -13.57
ω 0.00 0.00 2.70 0.01
α 0.07 0.01 4.72 0.00
γ -0.03 0.01 -2.21 0.03
β 0.94 0.01 99.54 0.00
Exponential GARCH - EGARCH(1,1)2
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
λ 0.00 0.00 -0.48 0.63
ω -0.20 0.04 -4.98 0.00
α 0.12 0.02 5.90 0.00
γ 0.03 0.01 2.74 0.01
β 0.99 0.00 291.75 0.00
1) See Glosten, Jaganathan, and Runkle (1993).
2) See Nelson (1991).
3) Unit root tests. All results indicate that there is no unit root at the 1% confidence level. 
4) The normal distributed line is simulated using the mean and the variance of the ILS/USD exchange rate changes during the sample period.  
ILS/USD exchange rate changes (%) - data generating process and basic statistics
(daily changes for the sample period: 10/2001 - 12/2004)
Histogram of ILS/USD exchange rate changes (%) vs. Normal distribution4
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Table 5
BOI Vs. OTC: 
Comparable data2
BOI Vs. TASE: 
Comparable data2
TASE Vs. OTC: 
All data6
TASE Vs. OTC: 
OTMF6
TASE Vs. OTC: 
ATMF6
TASE Vs. OTC: 
ITMF6
Mean tests3 Accepted Accepted Rejected** Rejected** Rejected* Rejected**
Median tests4 Accepted Accepted Rejected** Rejected** Accepted Rejected**
Variance tests5 Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected* Accepted Rejected**
# traded options (OTC/TASE) (4059/ ) ( /167423) (26775/887890) (14309/368988) (7134/278995) (5332/239907)
% of total (OTC/TASE) 27                                 32                                 100/100 (53/42) (27/31) (20/27)
TASE Vs. OTC: 
All data6
TASE Vs. OTC: 
OTMF6
TASE Vs. OTC: 
ATMF6
TASE Vs. OTC: 
ITMF6
Mean 3.1% 8.3% -4.6% 0.8%
Std 37.4% 51.4% 19.7% 9.9%
Min -94.1% -94.1% -74.9% -64.8%
Max 694.8% 694.8% 347.0% 72.3%
# traded options 11,397                   5,408                    2,539                    3,450                     
# Days Mean Median Std Skewness Kurthosis Min Max
BOI 306 7.2% 7.5% 1.9% 0.02                       -1.18                    4.0% 12.6%
OTC 306 7.5% 7.8% 1.9% 0.03                       -1.15                    3.7% 11.8%
TASE 306 7.5% 7.7% 2.1% -0.03                     -1.15                    3.6% 12.0%
Correlation Coefficient BOI - OTC => 0.92 BOI - TASE => 0.93 OTC - TASE => 0.97
# Days Mean Median Std Skewness Kurthosis Min Max
BOI Vs. OTC 306 -2.9% -3.2% 9.6% 0.58                       1.43                      -26.0% 36.0%
BOI Vs. TASE 306 -2.5% -3.0% 9.2% 0.29                       0.60                      -28.2% 29.9%
TASE Vs. OTC 551 1.4% 0.7% 11.0% 0.40                       1.41                      -36.7% 45.8%
(1) Consist of Bank Of Israel (BOI), Over the Counter (OTC), and Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) options traded on the same day.
(2) Consist of options whose moneyness is less than +/-.5% and time to expiration between 50 and 130 days . 
        BOI's options charcteristics are:  Moneyness = 0 and 90 days until expiration. 
(3) Based on Anova F test.
(4) Based on: Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney, Kruskal-Wallis, and van der Waerden tests.
(5) Based on: F, Siegel-Tukey, Bartlett, and Levene, tests.
(6)  OTMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is less than -0.5%, ATMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is moneyness is between -en -0.5% and 0.5%, and
     ITMF as transaction whose moneyness is larger than 0.5%. Days with less than 4 transactions were excluded from the sample.
(7) The vegas of options similar to method 1 of Brenner, Eldor, and Hauzer (BEH), Journal of Finance (2001). Positive figures  mean that ean that the premiums of options 
       traded in the 1st market are more expensive than options traded in the 2nd market. For example TASE options are more expensive than OTC premiums by 1.4%.   
(8)  Likewise FN (7) except it is based on daily means of BEH's liquidity premiums.
* Significant at 5% level ** Significant at 1% level
Implied volatility equality tests and BEH's liquidity premium: BOI vs. OTC and TASE
(Based on transactions when trade took place in both markets1, H0: markets are similar)
BEH's Iiquidity Premium8
 Implied Volatility
All transactions
Implied Volatility Implied Volatility by moneyness
BEH's Liquidity Premium by moneyness7
Comparabale daily data2
Table 6
Bid-Ask Spread2 Bid-Ask Spread2
ITMF1 ATMF1 OTMF1 All transactions ITMF1 ATMF1 OTMF1 All transactions
 Mean 14.4% 13.2% 11.2% 9.5% 20.2% 18.1% 13.9% 17.5%
 Median 10.2% 10.5% 8.8% 7.7% 17.6% 13.9% 11.8% 15.9%
 Std. Dev. 13.3% 10.6% 9.6% 7.2% 12.8% 15.4% 7.7% 8.4%
 Skewness 1.92                  1.26              2.01            1.36                1.29                 2.93           1.79             1.56                
 Kurtosis 5.59                  1.66              6.92            2.22                1.89                 12.34         4.14             3.89                
 Minimum 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 2.2% 3.1% 3.2% 4.2%
 Maximum 87.1% 57.4% 73.3% 41.6% 75.2% 131.1% 55.7% 63.7%
# days 334                   337               372             384                 502                  429            521              550                 
Implied Volatility Implied Volatility
ITMF1 ATMF1 OTMF1 All transactions ITMF1 ATMF1 OTMF1 All transactions
 Mean 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 9.0% 7.0% 8.1% 8.3%
 Median 7.7% 7.7% 7.8% 7.8% 9.0% 7.1% 8.4% 8.5%
 Std. Dev. 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.0%
 Skewness 0.07                  0.22              0.07            0.09                0.19                 0.14           -0.02            0.05                
 Kurtosis -1.02                 -0.24            -1.15           -1.12               -0.10                -0.98          -1.13            -0.96              
 Minimum 3.4% 0.0% 3.8% 3.9% 3.5% 3.3% 3.6% 3.6%
 Maximum 12.8% 14.8% 12.6% 12.6% 16.0% 12.8% 12.8% 13.5%
# days 548                   549               551             551                 550                  545            551              551                 
(1)  OTMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is less than -0.5%, ATMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is between -0.5% and 0.5%, and
     ITMF as transaction whose moneyness is larger than 0.5%. Contracts with less than 4 transactions were excluded from the sample.
(2)  Calculated as: (Ask - Bid)/(Ask + Bid)/2. Negative figures were excluded from the sample.
OTC
Bid-Ask spreads: OTC Vs. TASE
TASE
OTC TASE
(Based on daily means)
Table 7
TASE OTC
a)  OLS: Endogenous variable:
Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1 Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1
Intercept -0.47 -0.13 0.90 42.12 2.62 0.01
∆ Implied volatility 2.01 4.97 0.00 2.44 1.84 0.07
Log(Notional Value) 0.03 0.14 0.89 -2.23 -2.61 0.01
∆ Days to expiration 0.04 1.12 0.26 0.00 -0.05 0.96
∆ Moneyness -1.19 -1.81 0.07 -2.66 -1.42 0.16
AR(8)/AR(3)2 -0.49 -8.62 0.00 -0.52 -5.79 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.45
D.W. 1.99 2.00
b)  OLS: Endgenous variable:
Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1 Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1
Intercept -1.02 -1.86 0.06 -2.65 -1.96 0.05
∆ Bid-Ask Spread 0.02 4.62 0.00 0.01 1.75 0.08
Log(Notional Value) 0.07 1.86 0.06 0.14 1.98 0.05
∆ Days to expiration -0.01 -3.53 0.00 -0.01 -2.89 0.00
∆ Moneyness 0.36 6.23 0.00 -0.20 -2.09 0.04
AR(4)/AR(2)2 -0.28 -6.04 0.02 -0.20 -2.05 0.28
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.14
D.W. 2.00 1.97
c1)  TSLS: Endgenous variable:
Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1 Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1
Intercept 0.88 0.21 0.83 43.29 2.78 0.01
∆ Implied volatility 3.79 8.85 0.00 2.87 2.24 0.03
Log(Notional Value) -0.05 -0.20 0.84 -2.29 -2.78 0.01
∆ Days to expiration 0.07 1.90 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.99
∆ Moneyness -1.82 -2.74 0.01 -2.61 -1.45 0.15
AR(6)/AR(3)2 -0.45 -8.74 0.00 -0.51 -5.97 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.45
D.W. 2.03 2.00
c2)  TSLS: Endgenous variable:
Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1 Coefficient t-statistic Prob.1
Intercept -1.04 -1.91 0.06 -2.27 -1.98 0.05
∆ Bid-Ask Spread 0.03 8.52 0.00 0.01 1.96 0.05
Log(Notional Value) 0.07 1.91 0.06 0.12 2.00 0.05
∆ Days to expiration -0.01 -3.66 0.00 -0.01 -3.25 0.00
∆ Moneyness 0.36 6.31 0.00 -0.15 -2.09 0.04
AR(4)/AR(1)2 -0.30 -6.66 0.01 -0.28 -4.01 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.14
D.W. 2.00 2.01
1)  Bold figures represent significance level of 95 percent or higher while bold red figures represent level of 99 percent or higher.
2) Mean of the auto regressive components.
∆Implied Volatility ∆Implied Volatility
OLS and TSLS Regression results of the changes in Bid-ask spreads and Implied Volatility: OTC Vs. TASE
(Based on means of 551 days where both markets were active)
∆ Bid-Ask Spread ∆ Bid-Ask Spread
∆ Bid-Ask Spread ∆ Bid-Ask Spread
∆ Implied Volatility ∆ Implied Volatility
Table 8
ITMF2 ATMF2 OTMF2 All transactions ITMF2 ATMF2 OTMF2 All transactions
 Mean 64.2                  57.7                 15.3                 6.0                        25.3                  25.4                  2.0                    2.9                              
 Median 23.3                  17.3                 6.5                   3.0                        10.6                  8.8                    1.2                    1.5                              
 Std. Dev. 138.8                160.4               29.5                 10.4                      71.1                  100.9                2.4                    6.7                              
 Skewness 7.1                    6.6                   5.0                   5.9                        8.6                    10.3                  3.2                    10.3                            
 Kurtosis 72.1                  52.2                 32.4                 54.3                      89.3                  119.3                14.5                  139.3                          
 Minimum 0.0                    0.1                   0.0                   0.0                        0.0                    0.0                    0.0                    0.0                              
 Maximum 1,905                1,696               284                  137                       963                   1,417                20                     110                             
# days 546                   545                  550                  550                       549                   537                   550                   550                             
All transactions All transactions
 Mean -29.59              -4.95                 
 Median -7.93                -6.10                 
 Std. Dev. 160.05             169.11              
 Skewness -0.58                0.34                  
 Kurtosis 2.17                 7.50                  
 Minimum -639.65            -855.71             
 Maximum 543.82             1,036.38           
# days 401                  317                   
ITMF2 ATMF2 OTMF2 All transactions ITMF2 ATMF2 OTMF2 All transactions
 Mean 2.95                  -9.84                -3.43                -3.43                     -1.71                 -0.00                 0.20                  -0.51                          
 Median 2.89                  -8.10                -2.47                -5.24                     -                    -                    -                    -0.33                          
 Std. Dev. 69.31                17.64               80.54               41.21                    14.58                0.00                  14.42                14.47                          
 Skewness 0.14                  -0.82                0.56                 0.96                      -1.06                 0.03                  -0.28                 -0.26                          
 Kurtosis 8.78                  1.92                 3.41                 5.23                      4.70                  3.17                  3.85                  2.41                            
 Minimum -320.6               -85.9                -293.0              -127.6                   -79.6                 -0.0                   -71.8                 -58.8                          
 Maximum 429.0                41.8                 411.4               239.5                    39.8                  0.0                    66.9                  61.8                            
# days 517                   536                  530                  549                       551                   551                   551                   551                             
1)   The change of option prices over option volumes.
2)  OTMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is less than -0.5%, ATMF is defined as transaction whose moneyness is 
          between -0.5% and 0.5%, and  ITMF as transaction whose moneyness is larger than 0.5%. Contracts with  
          less than 3 transactions were excluded from the sample.
3)   Sk = ISD δ+25bp - ISDδ-25bp where,ISDδ+25bp (ISDδ-25bp) is the implied volatility of options whose moneyness is the hedge ratio+25 basis points (-25 bp).
          We include for ISD δ+25bp options in the range δ+15bp -- δ+35bp and for ISDδ-25bp options in the range δ-15bp -- δ-35bp.
4)  The deviation of the actual spot rate (S) from the derived spot (S*) using put-call-parity: S/S*-1 where, S* = (C-P+Xe-rT)e-r*T. This comparison has the disadvantage of
           different timing as C and P are daily means while S is the representative rate. So, deviations are not nessecary reflecting inefficiency.       
           However, the results are consistent with the other two measures and studies (e.g., Eldor et al., 2006).
Depth and efficiency measures: OTC Vs. TASE
(Based on daily means, Figures in basis points)
OTC
Put-Call Parity's Deviations 4 Put-Call Parity's Deviations 4
TASE
Skewness (SK) in ISD3 Skewness (SK) in ISD3
Market Depth1 Market Depth1
Table 9
Day of the Month Volume Volume per option
Number of 
transactions Volume
Volume per 
option
Number of 
transactions Volume
Volume per 
option
Number of 
transactions
1 28 41 69 48 103 46 20 82 25
2 30 39 79 50 97 52 23 82 29
3 35 43 82 55 99 56 37 110 34
4 36 44 82 46 91 51 33 93 36
5 29 43 68 50 103 49 36 118 30
6 33 45 74 49 102 48 32 95 34
7 32 47 69 42 84 50 23 105 21
8 32 40 79 41 94 44 31 88 36
9 40 44 90 53 104 51 25 86 29
10 40 43 95 53 93 56 37 102 36
11 41 46 89 61 93 66 38 96 39
12 33 40 83 49 97 50 32 100 32
13 40 46 87 47 98 47 35 89 39
14 36 43 84 42 97 43 28 114 25
15 36 45 80 45 95 47 34 105 32
16 32 41 78 44 98 44 28 97 29
17 53 58 92 51 94 54 30 94 32
18 59 65 91 47 103 45 27 85 32
19 72 77 93 63 110 57 34 112 30
20 68 72 94 53 96 55 38 96 39
21 53 64 83 37 87 43 26 105 25
22 52 68 76 41 99 41 27 85 32
23 47 81 57 22 83 27 23 108 21
24 28 64 44 25 119 21 17 93 18
25 20 69 29 22 122 18 16 87 18
26 17 68 24 18 97 19 15 102 14
27 23 64 36 23 101 22 25 138 18
28 17 59 28 17 95 18 18 165 11
29 16 46 36 20 81 24 18 98 18
30 25 57 44 28 94 30 17 97 18
31 20 74 27 27 111 24 17 117 14
Daily mean 36 54 69 41 98 42 27 101 27
Day after expiration 58 58 100 92 99 93 86 90 96
Day before expiration 97 78 124 61 96 63 94 96 98
Expiration day2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(1)  The table shows how the volumes and prices are influenced by TASE's expiration day. The higher volumes around TASE's expiration day are explained
           by the roll-over phenomenon. It also points on the relations between the markets.
(2)  Usually it is Tuesday of the 3rd week of the month. The mean of expiration day is considerd as 100.
TASE OTC BOI
Number of transactions and volume of all options in OTC, TASE, and BOI around TASE's expiration day 1
(As percentage of TASE expiration day's data)
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Appendix 1
Min USD Rate Max USD Rate Representative USD Rate(3) Average(4) USD Rate
Mean 9.7 7.4 8.8 8.7
Median 9.5 7.7 8.7 8.7
Standard Deviation 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.4
Kurtosis 2.3 1.3 0.3 1.5
Skewness 0.9 -0.8 0.4 0.1
Put options' Implied volatility (%) using…(2)
Min USD Rate Max USD Rate Representative USD Rate(3) Average(4) USD Rate
Mean 7.0 9.0 8.1 8.1
Median 7.2 8.7 7.9 8.0
Standard Deviation 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.0
Kurtosis 2.4 3.6 1.1 2.3
Skewness -0.7 1.2 0.7 0.6
Min USD Rate Max USD Rate Representative USD Rate(3) Average(4) USD Rate
Mean 8.4 8.1 8.4 8.4
Median 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3
Standard Deviation 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.2
Kurtosis 5.4 5.8 3.5 4.7
Skewness 0.4 -0.2 0.6 0.3
1)  Based on 9 samples of USD/NIS exchange rate along the trading day (each round hour). 
2) Implied Volatility is derived from OTC FX options.
3) The representative NIS/USD exchange rate is published by the Bank Of Israel once a day around 14:00. This rate is used in this paper. 
4) Average of maximum and minimum USD/NIS exchange rates.
Sensitivity of implied volatility to the Intraday USD Rate Used(1)
Call options' Implied volatility (%) using…(2)
All (Call+Put) options' Implied volatility (%) using…(2)
